Gangstering Grants: Bringing Power to Collective Efficacy Theory

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How do nonprofit organizations attempt to facilitate collective efficacy? Through an inductive ethnographic case study of efforts to reduce gang violence in the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago, this study shows the importance of power and funding competition. Specifically, nonprofits' efforts to facilitate collective efficacy depended on (1) strategic actions to manage competitors, and (2) their position in the city political field. Based on these findings, this article refines collective efficacy theory by integrating power relations and governance as forces that fundamentally shape neighborhood crime control efforts. The article concludes by discussing the implications for efforts to better integrate nonprofits, race, and the state into studies of collective efficacy and neighborhood crime control.

Enforcing social control in neighborhoods ridden with violent crime has been a central area of inquiry since sociology's inception. As 2015 and 2016 saw many US cities experience a surge in violent crime (Rosenfeld 2016), police legitimacy crises (Maguire, Nix, and Campbell 2017), and civil unrest (Dreier and Swanstrom 2014), social control remains a vitally important topic. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls' (1997) collective efficacy theory has been at the forefront of scholarly and policy efforts to understand and achieve social control in high crime neighborhoods. Volumes of research have supported the theory's premise that neighborhood social cohesion and shared expectations are correlated with reductions in violent crime (Kirk and Matsuda 2011; Sampson 2012; St. Jean 2007). In turn, policymakers have designed community policing programs (Uchida 2015) and crime interventions (Higgins and Hunt 2016) with the goal of building collective efficacy in high-crime neighborhoods.

Scholars, however, have criticized collective efficacy theory for its strict focus on neighborhood ecology and inattention to the workings of power, politics, and the state (Mcquarrie and Marwell 2009; Sanchez-Jankowski 2008; Wacquant 2002). Although Sampson (2012) refined collective efficacy theory to include the role of nonprofit community-based organizations and government agencies (Sampson 2012), the process whereby nonprofits facilitate collective efficacy remains notably underobserved by social scientists. Specifically, the collective efficacy theory assumes that nonprofits broker resources and express the voice of their community (Sampson 2012; Small 2009) when organizational sociologists have shown that nonprofits can also undermine or regulate collective action in urban settings (Lee, McQuarrie, and Walker 2015; Levine 2016). To open the black

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box of nonprofit organizational behavior in collective efficacy theory, this article asks: How do nonprofit organizations attempt to facilitate collective efficacy?

This study investigates this question through an ethnographic case study of efforts to facilitate collective efficacy in Little Village, a high-crime Chicago neighborhood. By "facilitating collective efficacy," I am referring specifically to whether a group of actors (e.g., residents, nonprofits, police, or city government agencies) developed social cohesion and shared expectations for executing a formal or informal crime control initiative. From 2007 to 2013, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork with community organizers, government officials, and residents as they attempted to create collective efficacy through four initiatives aimed at reducing violent crime.

Findings showed that nonprofits' competition for city crime prevention funding resulted in a top-down form of collective efficacy with advantages and disadvantages for crime prevention. Specifically, findings showed that nonprofits sought to facilitate collective efficacy by managing dissent from collaborators, neutralizing competitors, and establishing exclusive relationships with the mayor's office to keep public funding flowing to their organization. In the end, only one nonprofit (the Puebla Community Group [PCG]) facilitated collective efficacy not only by representing the community and brokering resources (Sampson 2012; Small 2009), but also by engaging in acts of exclusion, censorship, innuendo spreading, and neglect toward other neighborhood residents and nonprofits. These actions had the benefits of establishing shared expectations and social cohesion with the Mayor's office, which brought crime prevention resources to the neighborhood, but simultaneously alienated some residents and undermined interorganizational collaborations for crime prevention.

Observing nonprofits in action brings power relations more centrally to collective efficacy theory and, in doing so, makes several contributions. First, it can help researchers better understand institutional forces influencing the formation and particular manifestations of collective efficacy within neighborhoods. As Sampson (2012:153) argued, collective efficacy is "situated, relative, and can take on various forms with various aims, some of which can be more advantageous for crime prevention than others." By incorporating power, this study revealed how conditions like scarce funding for nonprofits may produce unhealthy competition that undermines crime prevention efforts. Second, a power relations approach can help scholars better interpret how ecological conditions affect neighborhood collective efficacy. For example, the relationship between neighborhood poverty and low collective efficacy can be interpreted as operating not only through resource scarcity, but also through unhealthy competition among neighborhood actors over a small pool of resources. Third, the power relations approach provides a bridge for urbanists and political sociologists to bring an additional insight to processes of social control within cities and communities (Lee, McQuarrie, and Walker 2015).

THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

Robert Sampson (2012, 149) defines collective efficacy as "social cohesion and shared expectations for social control." In the tradition of the Chicago school ecological approach, collective efficacy has been measured as a neighborhood score based on a 10-question survey of residents averaged and aggregated to the neighborhood level. Collective efficacy has been a strong predictor of variation in neighborhood violent crime rates, as well as

health outcomes in US cities and beyond (for a review of this vast literature, see St. Jean 2007 or Sampson 2012).

Since its introduction in the late 1990s, Sampson has revised aspects of collective efficacy theory in response to critiques questioning its emphasis on interpersonal ties (Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004), inattention to nonprofit organizations (Marwell 2007; McQuarrie and Marwell 2009; Small 2009), and geographic focus on neighborhoods when crime tends to be geographically concentrated in clusters of blocks (Braga and Clarke 2014). Specifically, Sampson (2012: 152) refined collective efficacy theory by arguing, "it does not require that neighbors or local police officers be one's friend. Institutional mechanisms may be sufficient." By institutional mechanisms, Sampson (2012: 158) is referring to nonprofit community-based organizations that "help sustain a capacity for social action in a way that transcends personal ties by creating tasks that demand collective responses." In this revision, Sampson provides a definition of collective efficacy that goes beyond residents and incorporates programs or collaborations among nonprofit organizations and government agencies.

Research, however, has yet to directly observe how nonprofit or government organizations facilitate collective efficacy at the institutional level. To date, most micro-level studies of collective efficacy have focused on residents on blocks instead of the public hearings, boardrooms, or organizing tables where nonprofits and government agencies operate. This is, in part, because collective efficacy has been theorized as a situational construct in the tradition of routine activities theory (Felson 2008). Blocks with low collective efficacy are thought to attract criminal offenders (St. Jean 2007), whereas blocks with high levels of collective efficacy are thought to deter crime (Wikstrom et al. 2010).

Incorporating nonprofits and government agencies, however, requires further refinement to collective efficacy theory because scholars have tended to (1) study collective efficacy as an attribute of individual neighborhoods, (2) exclusively conceptualize social structure as ecology, and (3) assume rather than observe how power operates during crime control initiatives. With respect to the first point, Sampson (2012:154) contends that social control is not attributable to individuals alone, but his methodology measures collective efficacy as an aggregate individual neighborhood statistic. This, understandably, is due to the constraints of using regression and hierarchical linear models to test collective efficacy as a predictor of neighborhood crime.

Conceptually, however, collective efficacy is still modeled after Bandura's (1997) psychological approach to self-efficacy, a social cognitive theory that focuses on individual personality characteristics. While self-efficacy theory might be helpful with understanding individual behavior, it is less helpful for understanding relational processes of deliberation, conflict resolution, or urban governance. To incorporate power, collective efficacy theory needs a refined microlevel framework that goes beyond individual psychological processes.

Collective efficacy theory also suffers from assumptions over how power operates within neighborhoods. To be specific, scholars of neighborhood social control have long assumed that "neighborhoods are places where *all* people want to live in a crime-free place" (Bursik and Grasmick 1993:15; Carr 2003:1257; Sampson 2002:98). This premise assumes consensus among neighborhood actors over *how* one should go about reducing crime, an assumption that political sociologists have long shown to be false (Clark 1968; Dahl 1961). Neighborhoods have actors with diverse interests and motivations that, most importantly, get adjudicated through community power structures (Doering 2017; Levine

2017; Marwell 2007; Pattillo 2007). For example, some residents may desire a tough-on-crime approach, nonprofits may want social programs, and other residents may want to negotiate with gangs. Missing from collective efficacy theory is any explanation of the deliberations or competitions that determine whose collective efficacy is executed and whose is not. When it comes to crime control, consensus cannot be assumed; it is a process to be studied (Rodriguez-Muniz 2017).

The systemic theory of neighborhood social organization, which incorporates government actors, similarly assumes that the formation of crime control efforts stem from neighborhoods' "regulatory capacity" or "ease" at building relationships between nonprofits and government agencies (Bursik and Grasmick 1993:86; Carr 2003:1280; Hunter 1985).[1] Neither Bursik nor Carr describes how "regulatory capacity" or interinstitutional relationships are achieved; rather, they are assumed to be products of neighborhood structural characteristics instead of power relations. Moreover, like collective efficacy, research on systemic social organization has been ahistorical. Relationships among nonprofits, government agencies, and residents have histories, and neglecting these histories can blind scholars from the possibility that politics may shape a neighborhood's ability to facilitate collective efficacy. For example, certain neighborhoods may have a harder time achieving shared expectations and social cohesion with city officials when the neighborhood has a history of political conflict with the mayor.

A POWER RELATIONS APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

This article proposes a power relations approach for understanding the formation of collective efficacy. The power relations approach is rooted in the field theory, which views social order as the outcome of collaboration or competition among actors for power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Levi-Martin 2003). Although previous research on systemic social organization and collective efficacy provide a similar emphasis on social ties, they lack concepts for explaining differences in power (Liu and Emirbayer 2016).

The power relations approach reconceptualizes collective efficacy as not only social cohesion and shared expectations among actors, but also a social order that actors collaborate or compete to establish or enforce. With this understanding, actors' ability to facilitate collective efficacy can also depend on how they manage dissent and neutralize competitors, or how they are positioned in the city political field. I define the city political field as social spaces where individuals, institutions, and governing bodies allocate resources and determine policy agendas for various geographic regions of a city.[2]

City political fields will vary from place to place, but at the most general level, the concept of a political field gives scholars a language to characterize social order within efforts to facilitate collective efficacy. This, for example, includes structures of resource allocation and decision-making that establish administrative hierarchies in crime prevention initiatives. In this case study, Chicago's political field for crime prevention was very hierarchical and centralized. The city government's primary funding agency preferred to work exclusively with one nonprofit in each neighborhood. The chosen nonprofit would receive the bulk of crime prevention resources and be designated as "community representatives" during deliberations and townhall meetings. This meant that, in Little Village, actors' position in the political field was based on the characteristics of their relationship

with city government. Field position shaped actors' ability to have facetime with government agencies, which, in turn, shaped their ability to compete for funding and influence the crime control policy agenda.

Chicago's extremely hierarchical and centralized political field placed neighborhood actors into two distinct field positions. The first was a dependent field position where actors were resource dependent on city government agencies and, thus, had face-to-face access to government officials but less power to lobby government agencies into changing the characteristics of crime control initiatives. In Little Village, Alderman Munoz and the nonprofit PCG were in dependent field positions. Although they were designated as "community representatives" for crime control programs, their dependent field position rendered them little power to dissent during deliberations as they feared the Mayor's office would cut off their funding.[3] As a result, both the Alderman and PCG sought to facilitate the collective efficacy as preferred by city government agencies.

The second type was an independent field position. Independent actors were not beholden to city government agencies in any way and had more power to dissent against proposed collective efficacy initiatives, but they had less face-to-face access with government officials. Actors in an independent field position included residents without personal ties to government officials, as well as nonprofit organizations whose funding came from private foundations. These actors also had their own visions for facilitating collective efficacy with expectations that often conflicted with government agencies. In Little Village, actors in these two field positions competed with one another to implement their preferred form of collective efficacy.

With this configuration of the political field, competition for city crime prevention funding had less to do with nonprofits' program effectiveness and more to do with nonprofits' ability to carry out city government's crime prevention policy agenda. Thus, to facilitate collective efficacy, the PCG needed to enforce a social order within the community, and they accomplished this by engaging in what community organizers called "gangstering grants," or the acts of securing funding from city government by (1) excluding, (2) censoring, (3) neglecting, and (4) spreading innuendo about other nonprofits or residents seeking city crime control resources. To clarify, I do not argue that all actors facilitating collective efficacy engage in the practice of "gangstering grants." Rather, these actions illuminate how power (through funding competition and the configuration of the city political field) influences nonprofits' methods for facilitating collective efficacy at the institutional level.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Demographically, Little Village has a relatively young population: The median age is 25.3 years with nearly a quarter of the population between 5 and 17 years old. About 90% of the population over age 25 years has no more than a high school education. The unemployment rate, according to the 2010 census, is relatively low (11.7%) by standards of comparable communities, yet poverty is fairly high (27%). According to the Chicago Police Department, Little Village's violent crime rate (Homicide, Aggravated Battery, Aggravated Assault, and Robbery) is 12.22 per 1,000 residents compared to the city average of 11.16 per 1,000 residents, which puts it in the upper-third group of the most violent neighborhoods in the city. The presence of street gangs in the neighborhood dates back

to the 1960s, when Little Village began transforming into a Mexican immigrant community. The neighborhood is home to three street gangs: the Two Sixers, Latin Kings, and 22 Boys.

Although structured as a weak-mayor strong city-council government, in reality, the city of Chicago operates in the reverse. Since the demise of the infamous Chicago political machine in the late 1970s, the Mayor's office has found other ways to manage neighborhood political leaders through the strategic allocation of city resources and campaign funds (Simpson 2001). As a city divided into 50 political wards (each with representatives, or Aldermen, who advocate for resources on their neighborhoods' behalf), Chicago is known as a city with 50 fiefdoms. Political scientist (and former Chicago Alderman) Dick Simpson (2001) refers to this phenomenon as "Aldermanic Privilege," a system where Aldermen receive complete discretion over resource allocation and economic development in their wards in exchange for supporting the Mayor's city-wide policy agendas. Over the past several decades, this political arrangement has waxed and waned through periods of conflict (like the "council wars" of the 1980s) and periods of stability. During times of conflict, the Mayor would often have to discipline unruly Aldermen by cutting resources and city services to their wards or even turning off their microphones during city council hearings (Simpson 2001). Over the course of this study (2007–2013), the city's political structure was in a period of relative stability.

Given the peculiarities of this local political structure, this study's findings cannot be generalized to the behavior of city governments, neighborhoods, or nonprofit organizations more broadly. Rather, the primary objective of this article is to make scholars aware of the importance of power in the processes whereby actors facilitate collective efficacy, a process that past studies of collective efficacy have taken for granted.

METHODS

I collected data from 2007–2013 using a variety of methods. From 2007–2009, I volunteered for a youth group at a neighborhood nonprofit organization (Youth Justice) as part of an unrelated study on adolescent peer pressure. Over the course of these two years, I developed friendships, professional relations, and social ties with eight nonprofit organizations engaging in violence prevention work in the neighborhood. This helped establish trust and rapport with the two largest neighborhood nonprofit organizations (the PCG and Youth Inc.), as well as collaborations with these organizations on violence prevention strategy and program evaluation.

In 2009, I began an informal collaboration with the PCG (the neighborhood's largest violence prevention organization) where I served as a research consultant for their violence prevention initiatives in exchange for their permission to observe their meetings and interview staff. From 2009–2012, I was a participant observer for three large-scale violence prevention programs initiated by the city mayor who tasked the PCG with creating collective efficacy among residents and nonprofits for these initiatives. Implemented months at a time, I shadowed frontline PCG staff as they worked directly with youth on the streets, in school hallways, and in recreation centers. Simultaneously, I attended internal staff meetings facilitated by PCG management (e.g., their executive director) where they discussed strategy and problem-solving. Over the three years, I observed 43 meetings and conducted 25 formal interviews with 17 community organizers (across the

neighborhood), one school principal, and the mayor's chief of staff. I also observed staff implement these programs 1 day a week over the 3-year time period, and followed up these observations with 72 informal interviews (asking questions to make sense of observations made in the field).

I conducted both formal and informal interviews multiple times with the same group of individual organizers. As the bulk of the data came from field notes taken by hand on a small notepad, informal interviews were conducted in car rides, lunch tables, hallways, or bathroom conversations where I would ask questions related to specific phenomena I observed. For example, after seeing a community organizer censor a resident at a public hearing, I would informally interview the community organizer about their actions in the car ride home instead of a formal sit-down interview. For questions that required a longer conversation, I arranged formal sit-down one-on-one interviews with each organizer in their private office where I used an audio-recorder. Dialogue at meetings was not audio recorded; however, I took exhaustive field notes at the meetings to capture the message of each speaker and spoke observations from meetings into an audio recorder immediately afterward to record key moments or quotes.

Shadowing front-line PCG staff as they implemented programs brought me to spaces where I encountered organizers from other nonprofit organizations and residents also engaged in violence prevention activities. I took advantage of my time in these spaces to build trust and rapport with residents and staff from other community organizations. Although I collaborated with the PCG, I was not a PCG employee. When non PCG actors asked for my institutional affiliation, I gave them my University affiliation. This helped persuade residents and nonprofit organizers who were rivals or suspicious of the PCG to speak with me.

By observing interactions among various actors (organizers, residents, school staff, and the mayor's chief of staff) and interviewing each of the actors, I engaged in what Matt Desmond (2014) calls "relational ethnography," or observation of actors or agencies occupying different positions within the same social space and bound together in a relationship of mutual dependence or struggle. In contrast to place-based neighborhood ethnographies, I took a relational approach of studying the collaborative or competitive dynamics among actors that facilitated or undermined collective efficacy. This approach enabled me to identify and observe relationships that spanned beyond the neighborhood's physical boundaries, such as the relationship between PCG staff and the mayor's chief of staff.

Data on the historical dynamics of the city and neighborhood political field come from one-on-one indepth interviews with 20 residents, 17 community organizers, and two politicians who lived and/or worked in the neighborhood over the past 30 years. In addition, I fact checked their accounts with local newspaper archives to confirm events, as well as biographies written about several of the prominent politicians featured in this study. I identify Chicago as the city and Little Village as the neighborhood where the study was conducted, but use pseudonyms for the names of individuals, nonprofits, and politicians who agreed to participate on the condition of being granted anonymity.

EXCLUSION AT THE NEIGHBORHOOD RECOVERY INITIATIVE

As the PCG staff meeting came to an end, Steve Beltran distributed a 3×5 inch card to everyone. "These are details for an important event I want you all to attend," Steve said. The card read "Public Hearing for the Neighborhood Recovery Initiative" with the date, time (6 PM), and location (a school gymnasium in Little Village). The hearing was one of three scheduled state-wide for community members to have input on a new violence prevention program funded by the Governor's office.

On the day of the hearing, I interviewed Larry Moore (director of Youth Inc., a Little Village violence prevention nonprofit) and asked if he was attending.

"What public hearing?" Larry asked. I grabbed the card from my bag and handed it to Larry.

"How the hell did I not know about this?" Larry lamented. Angry and upset, Larry called his staff to see if anyone could attend last minute but none could be reached.

I arrived at the hearing hours later only to find Steve Beltran, PCG staff, and three PCG clients in attendance. Only two other nonprofits attended, but they were from different neighborhoods on the city's far north side. The PCG excluded residents and rival nonprofits from attending at the public hearing. All attendees from Little Village were affiliated with their nonprofit. No Little Village residents were present. The PCG had inside knowledge about the hearing and refrained from publicizing it. This was one of many instances where the PCG excluded people to acquire funding for their preferred crime control initiative. In this example, the PCG aimed to control who could communicate directly with city and state officials. Under no circumstances did the PCG want another organization or resident speaking on the neighborhood's behalf.

At the public hearing, the PCG advocated for the Governor's office to continue funding its mentoring program aimed at gang-affiliated youth. The Governor's 12-member commission sat behind two tables facing the audience. A stenographer sat nearby transcribing testimony. The hearing began with the commission chair instructing the audience to address two questions in their testimony: (1) what are your recommendations for what state and local governments can do better to address violence in your community? And (2) what is the community's role in violence prevention and intervention?

Steve (PCG director) spoke first. After describing his childhood growing up in Little Village, Steve concluded:

"I've had family members and friends in gangs, but I made it through because of great mentors. My recommendation is that we need mentoring programs. At the PCG, we've been successful with our mentoring program. We know it works. We need you to keep funding it."

PCG staff and clients applauded Steve as he returned to his seat. Three teenage clients of the PCG's mentoring program spoke next.

"The PCG taught me a lot," said one teenager to the commission. "You should fund organizations who are trying to help the youth." The PCG came to the hearing with an agenda to advocate for its violent crime control initiative.

Ronald Dunbar (director of a violence prevention organization in a different neighborhood) addressed the commission next. Like Steve, Ronald recommended funding for mentoring programs but the commission countered with difficult questions.

"How do you know a mentoring program is effective?" a commission member asked.

"Um . . . you know . . . um," Ronald responded nervously.

"How are kids recruited into your mentoring program?" another commission member followed up. As Ronald stuttered, Steve walked to the microphone and asked Ronald if he could answer the question. Ronald eagerly obliged.

"My organization read this study published by [a local university] that said drop outs were most likely to commit violence. So, based on this, my organization targets drop outs." PCG staff applauded Steve again. Commission members smiled and nodded in affirmation of Steve's answer. Ronald's inability to answer the commission's questions had implications for the PCG's agenda. Thus, Steve interjected to defend the integrity of his organization's mentoring programs. Referencing a local university study was enough to address the commission's doubts. The hearing moved on to the next speaker.

In this field note, the PCG facilitated collective efficacy by developing shared expectations with the state commission over what constitutes a mentoring program that "effectively" reduces violence. Simultaneously, the PCG achieved this by excluding other residents or nonprofits from participating in this opportunity to influence policy. The PCG's exclusion of other residents and nonprofits helped protect its powerful position in the city political field and helped ensure that this effort to facilitate collective efficacy manifested in the form of mentoring programs.

This effort to facilitate collective efficacy succeeded as it produced a report that became the basis of Illinois Governor Pat Quinn's Neighborhood Recovery Initiative, which infused millions of dollars to violence-stricken neighborhoods throughout the state (one of which was Little Village). Mentoring programs were one of the most funded programs in the initiative. Months later, the PCG received $1.25 million dollars from the state to continue its mentoring programs.

In a car ride back to PCG headquarters, I asked Steve if he felt he repressed residents and other nonprofits. Steve answered, "I don't think that's a fair question. It was a public meeting. I could see people feeling that way because decisions were made without them."

"Then how else were people supposed to know?" I asked. "Don't you think this is undemocratic?"

"I don't like using that word 'democratic'," Steve answered, "because I don't think that's the right approach. You elect people to represent you and I think that's what's going on with organizing. You choose leaders to represent your community because that's just the way it works. For most government programs, it's really at most eight people that are involved in the major conversations. If you had 100 people in the room, nothing would get done."

PCG leaders justified their act of exclusion in the name of efficiency; however, the more notable feature of Steve's quote was how he viewed himself and the PCG as elected representatives when, in fact, they were not.[4] The quote illustrates that Steve recognizes his organization's position of power in the city political field, a position which he believes grants his organization the legitimacy to exclude others and exclusively govern violence prevention efforts. Steve felt the PCG's handling of the NRI public hearing was justified because they were playing by the rules of the city political field.

Excluded nonprofits organizers disagreed.

"I wished they stopped playing the political game and partnered with us for a change," said Larry (Youth Inc. director) in a follow-up interview after the hearing. "Organizations like the PCG are in the game to get more funding, not to actually prevent violence."

Numerous community organizers throughout Little Village levied these accusations against the PCG.

The PCG, however, viewed exclusion as necessary for neutralizing competitors whose approach to building collective efficacy would burn bridges with the Mayor's office.

"We have to be able to communicate with government officials in a way that challenges them but doesn't burn bridges," Steve explained.

"How do you do that?" I asked.

"You start by not inviting 'that guy' to a meeting with representatives from the Mayor's office."

"What do you mean by 'that guy'?"

"The ones that curse out government officials. A lot of the time they're residents. We've spent years carefully cultivating these relationships [with city officials], and we're not going to risk losing years-worth of work." This quote symbolizes the constraints of the PCG's dependent position in the city political field. Steve did not want to risk the resources and relationships the PCG had developed over the years by protesting against city officials.

While exclusion helped the PCG facilitate collective efficacy in a very particular way (e.g., through exclusive collaboration with city hall), it simultaneously undermined other forms of collective efficacy in the neighborhood. Youth Inc., for example, organized softball leagues with neighborhood gang members to build social cohesion and shared expectations that enabled them to intervene when episodes of gang violence erupted. In addition, neighborhood watch groups advocated for surveillance cameras, youth programs, or recreational sports activities on their blocks, but the PCG blocked these groups from ever meeting with government officials. The PCG's rationale was that these groups might protest against or upset city officials who, in response, would cut all funding to their organization and, thus, the neighborhood altogether.

CENSORING AT THE PUBLIC SAFETY INITIATIVE

The PCG's "gangstering" was more direct during the public safety initiative (PSI) in 2012. At a press conference, the Mayor's chief of staff (Chris Johnson) explained that the purpose of the PSI was to "clear, hold, and build open air drug markets" in the city's most violent neighborhoods.

"Drug markets cause violence in our neighborhoods," said Chris. "We plan to clear drug-selling areas by arresting dealers, holding the area by maintaining a 24-hour police presence, and building the area by growing community gardens to transform the space."

The mayor's office announced the initiative over television media; thus, the PCG could not withhold meeting details from residents or other nonprofits. The mayor's chief of staff, however, placed the PCG in charge of hosting and facilitating the first planning meeting for the PSI in Little Village. Like the neighborhood recovery initiative, this meeting was meant to solicit community input on this effort to facilitate collective efficacy.

The PCG leveraged its powerful position as meeting facilitator to censor resident participation and influence at the meeting. Days before the meeting, Howard explained the PCG's censorship strategy:

> Whoever controls the plan, controls the meeting. If you don't think about who is going to be
> at the meeting, you're going to lose control. It's important to be prepared and have the right

people in the room to balance things out. To say "let's all calm down," or "I've lived in this community too, let's not get mad."

"What's the risk of losing control of the meeting?" I asked.

"The risk is you don't get invited by the city to another meeting." Howard's quote once again represented the constraints of the PCG's dependent position in the city political field (e.g., through their dependence on funding from city government agencies to survive). Howard feared that if residents insulted or protested against the mayor's representatives, it would jeopardize the PCG's funding.

Chris (the Mayor's chief of staff overseeing the PSI) echoed Howard's point as I spoke with him before the start of the meeting.

"It's a lot easier for us to work with neighborhoods when we know who is the lead organization. The organization that can mobilize people quickly, and make things happen fast," Chris explained. "It's how collective efficacy is made. You know, where the community gets together to try and do something about violence."

The mayor's chief of staff actually used the term "collective efficacy" to describe what the mayor was trying to achieve through his partnerships with organizations like the PCG. His quote revealed that the mayor's office viewed collective efficacy as a partnership with "lead organizations" to get things done fast and efficiently. By referencing a "lead organization," Chris is describing his ideal social order for collective efficacy building efforts (e.g., a political field with a nonprofit in a resource dependent relationship with the city government). While collective efficacy theorists have overlooked power relations (Sampson 2012), Chris's quote shows that institutional actors seeking to facilitate collective efficacy take power into serious consideration when planning and executing their efforts. Scholarship needs to follow suit. The power relations Chris described determined which form of collective efficacy (among many advocated by community members) was implemented as crime control initiatives in Little Village.

Although Chris and the mayor's office were motivated by the need for efficiency or timeliness, the history of conflict between the PCG and the mayor's office reveals political motivations as well. The mayor's relationship with the PCG has historically been a relationship of socially controlling a potential political enemy. Founded in the early 2000s, the PCG began as a radical leftist nonprofit organization whose signature accomplishment was organizing a hunger strike in protest of the Mayor's broken promise to build a new high school. The hunger strike succeeded. The city caved and built a new high school, but the Mayor's office altered its approach to collaborating with the PCG. Instead of being combative, the Mayor's office "channeled" the PCG by providing millions of dollars in grants, thereby rendering them dependent on government grant money for survival (McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991). The city government's control over the PCG was evident through the countless times the PCG expressed fear of losing its government funding for protest or dissent.

The mayor's office had an interest in "efficiency" for crime control initiatives because it preserved their social control over a political adversary through the PCG. Instead of government officials managing dissent and censoring residents, it was the PCG that preserved the political order of the city and undermined other forms of collective action in Little Village. The PCG put this process on display at the PSI where they censored residents.

The PSI's first public meeting took place at a neighborhood banquet hall. The goal of this initial meeting was to introduce the initiative and delegate tasks. A total of 30 people attended. It was a mix of residents, community organizers, police, and business owners. Steve began the meeting by introducing Chris (the Mayor's chief of staff), who then stood up and addressed the room. Chris began by describing his personal background, then explained the mayor's "clear, hold, and build" strategy. At the end of his remarks, Chris told everyone "this plan is not set in stone. The mayor is willing to implement any strategy put forth by the community. I hope we can start a conversation about this." Chris then opened the floor to questions.

After a few questions about logistics, a short man with gray hair stood up and introduced himself as Esteban, a life-long Little Village resident and owner of a skate shop. He then immediately began criticizing the mayor for his neglect of Little Village:

> I been living in Little Village my whole life, like 50 years, and the violence has been constant. But it's not just the drugs and gangs that hassle the kids in the neighborhood, they also got to worry about the cops, because cops be mistaking skateboarders for gang members all the time [Police Commander Huerta, seated four rows away from the resident, rolled his eyes in reaction to Esteban's comments]. Instead of talking about clear, hold, and build, why doesn't the mayor get the cops to think about changing . . .

Steve quickly interrupted Esteban.

"Hey brother, I hear your thoughts man, that's some great stuff, but could you wrap up what you're trying to say because we only got so much time."

"Oh, I'm sorry," Esteban replied, "all I was trying to say was that the city needs to invest in the neighborhood. Name me one place in the neighborhood where a kid can buy a canvass? Just one, and that's in my shop down the street. I've got . . . "

Howard interrupted Esteban.

"You are right, we need more space, and remember to bring that up when we determine our priorities for this initiative, but right now, we're just trying to understand some basic things and we'd like to move on to the next question."

Chris interjected, "Thank you for sharing that."

Esteban sat down in his seat and replied, "Alright, cool. Thanks."

Citing time constraints, Steve and Howard interrupted Esteban's criticism of the mayor and his ideas for an initiative aimed at holding police accountable for abusing youth.

After a few more questions, another resident named Ignacio raised his hand and asked Chris the following:

> "How is this public safety initiative different than initiatives of the past? Is this something permanent? Or is the mayor just trying to make it look like he's doing something? This strategy of 'clear, hold, and build' is a military strategy, the same strategy used to fight the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and look at where that got us. How do we know that if we clear one part of Little Village crime isn't just going to move to the block next to it?"

"Then we'll clear it again wherever it goes," Chris replied.

> "But don't you see? That's the problem! All you guys are doing is locking more of our people up, and all that's doing is destabilizing our community, our families, our children. For a change, can we think of some other way to change the community without locking people up? To have programs and legitimate alternatives to incarceration? There are cities that do

things like peer juries, or alternative justice systems that try to come up with alternatives to prison time for young people. We can . . . "

Steve interrupted Ignacio.

"We are just about out of time! We need to wrap things up. Chris has five more of these meetings in other neighborhoods today and we want to be mindful of his time."

Ignacio crossed his arms in frustration and responded, "Ok."

Steve turned to the audience, "That wraps things up our meeting. Any last thoughts?"

Chris interjected, "It's important that you set up an executive committee soon so things can move a lot faster [asking for a show of hands]. How many people here would be willing to be on the executive committee for the PSI in Little Village?" Eight community organizers raised their hands including both Esteban and Ignacio (the two residents who were censored).

In these interactions, the PCG not only censored residents' criticism of police and the mayor, but also promoted the city's preferred form of collective efficacy. Esteban and Ignacio, however, preferred that the initiative focus on reforming police behavior instead of arresting more young people. This field note shows how collective efficacy is the outcome of power relations where actors need to adjudicate among competing ideas or dissenting opinions for making a crime control initiative a reality.

Although the meeting concluded, the PCG still had some work to do. Esteban and Ignacio both volunteered to be on the executive committee; thus, the PCG had to find another way to prevent them from participating. Steve and Howard wasted no time. As soon as the public hearing ended, Steve (who sat next to me) whispered to Howard, "Let's hold a meeting amongst ourselves before the next official meeting." As a participant observer who volunteered to evaluate the PSI's effects on neighborhood crime, Steve invited me and three other PCG staff members (Howard, John, and Manny) to a closed-door meeting at PCG headquarters the next day. Steve informed us that the meeting's purpose was to (1) determine who to include on the executive committee and (2) how to justify this to residents and nonprofit organizations in attendance.

The private meeting began with Manny getting straight to the point.

"I don't think just anybody should be on the executive committee," Manny argued. "I know Ignacio and Esteban raised their hands, but I don't think they're reliable."

"Then we need to establish criteria for people who can be on the executive committee," Steve answered.

With a dry-erase marker in hand, Steve wrote on the board as he said aloud, "Executive committee members must be able to (1) influence collaboration among organizations, and (2) must be the key decision maker of an institution." Steve faced the group and asked, "sound good?"

"Yes," everyone said in agreement. By mandating that executive committee members must be affiliated with a formal institution like the police or a nonprofit organization, Steve's criteria excluded Esteban and Ignacio.

The rest of the meeting focused on how to control attendees at future PSI meetings.

"I don't want the next meeting to be another meeting where people just talk," said Manny. "Let's present people a menu of violence prevention strategies to choose from and go from there."

"That shouldn't be a problem," said Steve, "The city reached out to us [the PCG] to facilitate this process from the beginning anyway, we're the 'lead organization'." Like

before, Steve justified the PCG's censorship of residents by referencing their position of power as "lead organization."

Presenting themselves as "lead organization" at the meeting, however, required additional thinking over how to legitimize this power structure to meeting attendees. Manny turned to Howard and asked, "Since you're already doing violence prevention stuff, why don't we make you chair of the PSI executive committee?"

"I don't like that," Howard replied. "We need be careful with how we phrase that because I don't want it to sound like I'm bossing people around. We should phrase it differently." Howard knew that some residents or nonprofits may dissent against the PCG's position as lead organization for the PSI; thus, he conveyed the need to describe the PCG's field position more strategically.

In response, Steve used a dry-erase marker to draw a figure representing power relations. He drew the Mayor's office at the top, PCG in the middle, and all of the other organizations below it listed side by side. The room fell silent as everyone paused for a few minutes to think about how to present this to the audience at the next meeting.

"I got it!" Manny exclaimed.

Manny got up, walked to the board, erased the PGG and Mayor's office from the top of the drawing, and redrew the PCG and Mayor's office below all the organizations in the chart.

"Community members are at the top, the Mayor's office is at the bottom, and we [the PCG] is in the middle, simply communicating the needs of the community." Steve smiled and replied, "That's really good, we'll go with that."

In 30 minutes, the two residents who spoke against the mayor were removed from the executive committee. The PCG believed Esteban and Ignacio would not only slow down the PSI but also risk burning bridges with city officials. Manny's clever editing of the initiative's power relations cloaked the PCG's field position to other organizers and residents in the room. Although the PCG was, indeed, brokering resources between the mayor's office and Little Village, they were simultaneously preserving the social order of this effort to facilitate collective efficacy.

One week later, the PCG's plan succeeded without a hitch. Steve introduced their idea for the organizational structure, no one dissented, and the group moved on to the implementation phase. Esteban and Steve, however, were not present. I followed up with Esteban by visiting his skate shop. "Why weren't you at the meeting?" I asked.

"I didn't even know there were any meetings going on anymore. I tried calling Steve and Howard, but they never called me back."

"Did you ask anyone else?"

"Nah, not really," Esteban answered, "because [the PCG] just didn't seem all that interested in hearing us talk. I've heard neighbors talk about how the PCG is in cahoots with the politicians, and I didn't believe it until the meeting where they didn't let me or that other guy [Ignacio] talk." By not responding to Esteban's calls, the PCG blocked him from participating.

The PCG, however, was more direct with Ignacio. "Steve said they wished I could be on the executive committee," said Ignacio, who walked into PCG headquarters to inquire about the next meeting, "but that the city wanted directors of organizations to be on the executive committee." Ignacio shook his head in disbelief. "The city is just going to go ahead with their 'clear, hold, and build' shit anyway." By blaming city officials and not returning calls, the PCG prevented Ignacio and Esteban's participation.

After a series of additional meetings, the PSI resulted in an expansion of the city's graffiti removal services in Little Village. The police did not perform their "clear, hold, and build" strategy. Instead, the PCG helped distribute flyers throughout the neighborhood to spread word of a phone number residents could call to have graffiti removed from their property. The PCG estimated that the initiative resulted in 350–400 properties receiving graffiti removal services.

HOW SPREADING INNUENDO CAN UNDERMINE COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

In 2009, the mayor funded a multimillion dollar violence prevention program called "Patrol for Peace." The effort involved two programs to be implemented at the city's five most violent high schools. First, a mentoring program aimed at increasing school attendance among 50 students in each school. Second, a block patrol program that sought to deter violence on school grounds by having nonprofit community organization staff patrolling residential blocks surrounding the school. Perez High School in Little Village was selected as a site for the intervention, and the PCG won the contract to implement the program. The case of Patrol for Peace reveals how the unhealthy competition for funding (specifically, through the spreading of innuendo) can undermine efforts to facilitate collective efficacy.

With the memory of the PCG's "gangstering" Governor Quinn's NRI fresh on their minds, Larry and his organization (Youth Inc.) devised a plan to retaliate.

"Fuck the PCG," said Freddy. "Grants need to be renewed every year, and if you're not doing a good job, the city can give the grant to somebody else. Why don't we gangster the grant from them?" By "gangstering the grant," Freddy meant undermining the PCG's reputation by spreading innuendo among city funders out of hope that Youth Inc. could secure the grant. "Gangstering grants" was a colloquial term used among most nonprofit organizers in Little Village to refer to strategic acts aimed at neutralizing competitive forms of collective efficacy. "Let me talk to the school principal," said Larry, "and I'll see what we can do." The principal was Larry's long-time friend who had preferred that Youth Inc. implement the Patrol for Peace program over the PCG.

Although the PCG won the city grant to implement these programs, the PCG had no control over its relationship with the school principal. To their misfortune, the city asked the PCG to implement the programs at a school where the principal was an ally of their fiercest competitor (Youth Inc.). As a result, the PCG became the victim of "gangstering" from a rival nonprofit.

"Are you guys trying to gangster the PCG?" I asked Freddy a week later. Freddy paused before answering, "We have some of our own political relationships too, and we're going to use them to our advantage." Freddy did not directly share details, but after shadowing PCG staff members implementing the programs it became obvious that the principal and Youth Inc. were "gangstering" the PCG.

The principal began by firing block patrol staff. Sitting across from me at a diner, Tony, the PCG supervisor's phone could not stop ringing. Police officers, teachers, and residents were complaining about the crossing guards. "During lunch hours, Principal Valdez drives her car around the school and calls police on our patrol staff smoking or using their cell phones on the job," Tony said. School rules prohibit phone use and smoking

by employees on school grounds, and after three offenses staff faced termination. Twice a week, Tony and I saw Principal Valdez driving her car around the school watching the patrol staff. Principal Valdez fired 12 of the 45 patrol staff, leaving Tony scrambling for replacements.

The principal also sabotaged the mentoring program by preventing PCG mentors from entering the school.

"I tried walking in," said Richard (a PCG mentor) "but they let me into the waiting room, and I was not allowed to enter the hallways or lunch areas of the school. How in the hell am I supposed to find these kids [mentees]?" Richard continued, "They told us we had to meet our students in the waiting room after school finished, but most of these kids ditch school early." These circumstances made it difficult for mentors to meet with students who often blew off appointments. Mentors had to catch their students leaving school or hope to find them at home.

The school required PCG mentors to obtain consent from their mentees' parents before beginning sessions, but without access to any information from the school, mentors spent their first month searching for parents instead of meeting with mentees. Half of the mentors quit out of frustration by the end of the Fall semester, sending the PCG scrambling to find replacements.

Nilda (PCG staffer) believed the principal was undermining her after seeing the principal give Youth Inc. staff preferential treatment. Nilda and I walked past an exit door right outside the school when we ran into Freddy (a Youth Inc. worker) as he exited. "What are you doing here?" Nilda asked.

"Principal Valdez was my old high school teacher," Freddy said, laughing. "We go way back. She gives us free reign at the school. I don't even have to sign in to enter, I can go and pull a kid out of class when we need to." Freddy was boasting about his organization's privileges.

"That principal is a dictator," Nilda vented. "She does whatever she wants and doesn't have to explain anything to us."

The principal and Youth Inc. undermined the PCG's effort to create collective efficacy, as neither of the programs were properly executed. Their effort to "gangster" funding away from the PCG did not work. The city discontinued the mentoring program and continued funding the PCG's patrol program. Youth Inc.'s attempt to undermine the PCG, however, reminded the PCG of the importance of tightly preserving the social order of crime control initiatives through exclusion and censorship. When I asked Howard (PCG organizer) to comment on Youth Inc.'s behavior, he was surprisingly diplomatic.

"Every organization wants to be the 'lead organization' in their neighborhood," said Howard (PCG organizer). "This just shows how organizations like Youth Inc. will do whatever they can to mess things up for us." Howard's empathy for Youth Inc.'s actions reveals his knowledge of both the PCG's and Youth Inc.'s positions in the city's political field. For Howard, Youth Inc. was just playing by the rules of the political field.

NEGLECTING RESIDENTS

Little Village residents occupied an independent position in the city political field. In contrast to residents in Patrick Carr's study of the Beltway neighborhood of Chicago (who were police officers or firefighters with direct ties to city officials), Little Village was home

to mostly low-income working-class Mexican immigrant households. Many did not speak English. Most were not registered voters. When Little Village residents informally worked collectively to control the gangs on their blocks, they needed help from police, Alderman Munoz, or nonprofits like the PCG.

This final case of an informal residential block club (which I refer to as the Blackrock group) describes how nonprofits' and politicians' concerns about maintaining their powerful positions in the city political field contributed to their neglect of residents' informal efforts to facilitate collective efficacy. The PCG and Alderman Munoz's dependence on the mayor's office for resources made it risky for them to support the residents' effort to advocate for more city resources. Steve Beltran and Alderman Munoz feared that by lobbying the mayor's office for more resources, they risked being labeled as activists and being disciplined through funding cuts. Consequently, Alderman Munoz and Steve neglected the residents' informal collective efficacy by simply refusing to meet with them.

Blackrock street was 50 yards away from the border street dividing the neighborhood's two major gang territories (i.e., the Latin Kings and the Two Six). Blackrock was also a one-way street without speed bumps that fed into a busy street, making it easy for drive-by shooters to get away. When I canvassed the 4200 block of Blackrock street in June 2010, four shootings had occurred on the block in the past 3 months. Each shooting targeted one home on the block where Two-Six gang members resided. The perpetrators were gang members from other neighborhoods who shot at Two-Six gang members sitting on the front porch and then drove off.

"The gang members sitting on the porch are lookouts for the drug dealing they do inside," said Matthew (a resident who lived across from the gang). Matthew founded the Blackrock group after knocking on doors on the block. A total of eight out of the 16 households on the block joined the group, and they first reached out to the police, who were of little help. "When we first went to the police station, they told us to just call 911 when we see something, but they would never show up on time," said Dolores (a block group member). "We thought it would be easier if the police just put up a surveillance camera on the street corner facing the gang members' home."

Starting in 2005, the city invested millions of dollars into installing 8,000 police operated surveillance cameras near schools, hospitals, or crime hotspots throughout the city. Little Village had seven surveillance cameras, which could be easily spotted because of their distinct blue light, but the cameras were located near school grounds. Moreover, each camera cost at least $100,000 to operate on a yearly basis. Installing a camera on Blackrock street meant residents needed to find additional city revenue for the neighborhood. They tried the police again.

"The police chief told us they don't have that kind of decision-making power, and that we should talk to Alderman Munoz instead," Matthew explained. Scheduling a meeting with Alderman Munoz turned out to be more difficult than the block group anticipated. Dolores explained,

"You go to [the Alderman's] office, and they say you need an appointment. You schedule an appointment and then they cancel, asking you to setup another appointment. It's bullshit. The only other way you can see him is when he walks his dog. He's happy to talk to you about anything except your problems. When I spotted him once, I started telling him about the shootings on our corner, and he stopped me telling me he didn't have time and that I should make an appointment!"

For weeks, the block group sought a face-to-face meeting with the Alderman only to be cancelled on. Begrudgingly, the group settled for a face-to-face meeting with his assistant.

"We were told they could not help because they had no money. We asked why other parts of the neighborhood get surveillance cameras but not us, and he told us the cameras were near schools and parks. That they want to prioritize the places where kids play."

The PCG similarly provided no help to the block group. "Have you guys tried contacting the PCG?" I asked. Matthew answered, "Yeah, but they haven't even called us back. It's been months. And when we show up to their office, no one is there to talk to us so we just gave up on them." Both Steve Beltran and Alderman Munoz acknowledged their inability to help the Blackrock group. Steve explained, "Residents jump to the conclusion that we must not care if we don't meet their need. They don't know that time and resources are limited. I admit, we struggle with returning people's phone calls."

"Don't you worry you're eroding residents' desire to improve the neighborhood?" I asked.

"Not anymore," Steve answered. "In this line of work you have to pick and choose your battles with the city." Steve's quote illustrates how his organization's dependence on the Mayor's office contributed to their neglect of the Blackrock group. As they depended on the city for funding, the PCG had to "pick and choose" its battles. Advocating for more resources in this situation risked their ability to advocate for other kinds of resources or, even worse, jeopardize their current level of resources. Howard explained,

> "It's difficult to hold the city accountable for anything, let alone ask for more resources. For example, I was in a meeting with a staffer from the mayor's office. The staffer was saying we agreed to a date to hold a press conference when we, in fact, did not set a date. So I pushed back. I told them we didn't agree to a date. Our organization wasn't prepared for it. We agreed on another date for the press conference. The next day I get a call from Steve telling me the mayor's office called asking why we were all of a sudden adopting 'Alinsky tactics.' And that was over a date for a press conference! Imagine if we pushed them for money for a camera!"

Dependent on the city for resources, the PCG had little power to disagree with city officials, let alone lobby for additional resources. By "Alinsky tactics," the mayor's office referred to Saul Alinsky's (1971) "radical" activist strategies for gaining political power. As the mayor's office viewed disagreeing over a date as "activism," the PCG wanted no involvement in supporting the Blackrock group's effort to lobby for a surveillance camera.

Alderman Munoz echoed the PCG's fear of reprisal from the mayor's office. When asked why he cannot advocate for more resources, Alderman Munoz answered, "You gotta survive in city council sometimes. I need to have an agreement with the mayor. To get things done in my neighborhood, I need to offer him support for something in exchange. When you represent a ward with lots of needs like a school, park, or pool, that's the kind of haggling you have to do with city hall."

"What if you pushed hard for more resources from the mayor?"

"I don't want to walk down that dark alley." The Alderman refused to go into any further detail on the statement, but his reluctance and use of the ominous descriptor "dark alley" suggest he feared being disciplined by the mayor's office. Both the PCG and Alderman Munoz feared that advocating for resources on behalf of the Blackrock group would anger the mayor's office and jeopardize their government funding. As a result, they neglected the Blackrock group's collective efficacy by ignoring their requests for help.

Having exhausted all their options, the Blackrock group redirected their collective efficacy toward negotiating with gang members. Their attempt, however, was fruitless.

"We approached [the gang members]," said Dolores, "telling them we didn't want them standing outside anymore because one of the bullets might hit our kids. And they just said 'Fuck you, we don't care, stay inside.'" After this final failed attempt, residents on Blackrock resorted to staying indoors as much as possible. The Blackrock group stopped meeting. The collective efficacy they built withered away.

CONCLUSION

This paper reconceptualized collective efficacy theory as not only social cohesion and shared expectations among actors (Sampson 2012), but also a social order that actors collaborate or compete to establish or enforce. Making power more central to the study of collective efficacy has important implications for how scholars understand the roles of nonprofits, race, and the state in neighborhood crime control efforts.

The findings from this case study present a troubling prospect concerning the role of nonprofits, especially in low-income communities of color. While scholars laud nonprofits as resources brokers and causes of the great urban crime drop of the 1990s (Sampson 2012; Sharkey, Torrats-Espinosa, and Takyar 2017), findings from Little Village open the possibility that nonprofits might also be undermining democratic participation through the ways they enforce order within crime control initiatives. Making collective efficacy happen at the institutional level requires more than just contracts or handshakes, it involves managing dissent, neutralizing competitors, and enforcing a political order. One might argue that this characterizes an alternative form of community policing, not of potential criminals, but of community members seeking to change the local government's crime control policy agenda. This raises the question of whether crime reductions are worth the potential erosion of democratic participation among cities' most disadvantaged. The tradeoff might be worth it in the short term, but the periodic episodes of violent unrest and uprisings in cities suggest it may not be in the long term.

The findings from this study also have important implications for how scholars integrate race with the study of collective efficacy. While race is typically measured as a structural characteristic through measures like a neighborhood's racial composition, an institutional analysis of collective efficacy highlights how race matters through the role intermediaries or "middlemen" (Pattillo 2007) play for Black and Latino communities in crime control efforts. Terms like double-consciousness (DuBois 1904), liminality (Turner 1967), and "middlenesss" (Pattillo 2007) have been used to characterize individuals like Steve and Howard of the PCG in Little Village. Race, therefore, operates in neighborhood crime control efforts through the forces that constrain communities of color into needing one (and only one) community representative who must discipline all the others on behalf of local government. Race operates through the forces that enable or constrain nonprofit leaders in their "middle" position to take certain courses of action. Such processes are not new, they are part of a long and well-documented history of racialized governance in both Chicago (Hirsch 2009) and the United States as a whole (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). However, integrating power relations into collective efficacy enables

urbanists and criminologists to better incorporate race into their analyses of collective efficacy and neighborhood crime control.

A power relations approach to collective efficacy also enables criminologists to develop a richer sense of the institutional forces facilitating or impeding crime control efforts. While criminologists show that violent crime often erupts through power relations among criminal groups (Papachristos 2009), this article shows that the dearth of collective efficacy in a neighborhood can similarly stem from power relations among residents, nonprofits, and government agencies. Power relations do not only structure relations among gangs, they also structure relations among peacemakers for better or worse. Studying power relations can also extend ecological approaches to collective efficacy. For example, ecological approaches have shown neighborhood poverty is negatively correlated with neighborhood collective efficacy. The power relations approach, at the micro level, can reveal that this relationship unfolds, not just through the absence of resources, but through the presence of unhealthy competition among neighborhood actors over a small amount of resources. Power relations can shape neighborhood ecologies and vice versa.

For urban sociology more broadly, this article demonstrates that Fligstein and McAdam's (2015) theory of the state as strategic action fields can be useful for alternative theorizing of the state in the study of neighborhoods. Urbanists like Stone (1989) and Logan and Molotch (2007) have long conceptualized the state through concepts like "growth machines" or "urban regimes," which focus on relations between political and economic elites within cities that shape the construction of urban space. These theories, however, have been criticized for their inability to explain change, as well as their structural determinism. The study of power relations and political fields in cities provides urban sociologists with ways to connect neighborhoods to the wider social and political order of society. It advances a relational, fragmented, and diffuse conceptualization of the state that views the production of urban space as the outcome of collaboration or competition among state and nonstate actors, as opposed to a monolithic, mechanical, or coordinated force. As Sampson (2012: 61) argues, "the ways in which neighborhood networks are tied into the larger social structure of the city are not well understood or rarely studied." This case study shows one way that urbanists can connect political economy with neighborhood dynamics through the study of fields and power relations.

Like all case studies, however, generalizability from this study is limited by the selection of Chicago as the field site. Known for its machine-styled city politics and fiefdom-styled ward politics, the Chicago context is unique compared to the political structures of other American cities (Simpson 2001; Small 2008). The unhealthy forms of competition and strongly defined field positions (e.g., political independents and dependents) are unlikely to appear in all other cities. Nevertheless, the case study still makes an important generalizable point, which is that future research should not assume consensus or take power for granted in efforts to facilitate collective efficacy. Manifestations of power will look different in other cities, but processes of distributing power and arriving at consensus need to be observed in order to more fully understand how actors facilitate collective efficacy for better or worse.

The article also has important implications for policy efforts to create collective efficacy in high-crime neighborhoods. The largest implication for policymakers is that creating collective efficacy goes hand-in-hand with the art of urban governance. In other words, producing collective efficacy (or any form of collective action for that matter) involves the process of adjudicating among several ideas, coming to a consensus, and dealing with

actors whose ideas conflict with dominant policy agendas. Policymakers often approach high-crime neighborhoods without historical knowledge of past efforts to build collective efficacy. Instead of taking a one-size-fits-all approach to facilitate collective efficacy, policymakers should be more thoughtful about how they form ties with community representatives and how they reject citizens' ideas or preferences for crime control. More transparency and mechanisms of government accountability may help local governments allocate resources and build collective efficacy in more constructive ways or, at the very least, prepare for the resentment and bad blood that may come from supporting some residents' efforts to build collective efficacy over others.

Notes

[1] For a long time, proponents of systemic social organization argued that social ties were sufficient to produce social control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Janowitz 1975). But numerous studies have contested this claim (Carr 2003; Pattillo 1998; Sampson 2012; Warner and Rountree 1997).

[2] Nicole Marwell's (2007) study of Brooklyn neighborhoods similarly uses the notion of political field to describe how nonprofit organizations, politicians, and residents engage in a "triadic exchange" where resource allocation is governed by exchanges among political actors. I extend Marwell's work by incorporating Fligstein and McAdam's (2015) notion of strategic action fields, which provides a language and set of theoretical tools for understanding change in political, nonprofit, and residents' relations and field positions over time.

[3] The actors in any given city's political field will vary from place to place as cities have different governance structures, but in the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago, the major actors were residents, nonprofit organizations, police, Alderman (i.e., city council representative), and the mayor's office. These actors competed to achieve their preferred form of collective efficacy in Little Village.

[4] Levine (2016) uncovered a similar dynamic among Boston nonprofit organizations engaged in community development work.

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